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Any discussion of constitutional limits on regulating militias
includes its share of ironies, particularly for those who take the
historical Constitution seriously. First, the private militia move-
ment can be seen as a response, at least in part, to an extremely
revisionist reading of the Second Amendment. The revisionist
reading is that the Second Amendment guarantees arms only to
a "collective group" called the militia and offers no protection to
a "personal" right to have firearms.' This collective (or states)
right(s) view is a twentieth century invention; or, as one promi-
nent scholar put it, such an understanding was the best kept
secret of the eighteenth century.2 The irony is that the most
frightening invocation of the Second Amendment can thus be
traced to the Second Amendment's worst skeptics. The second
irony of the modern debate concerns the tendency to forget that
the founding generation believed individuals had a personal and
natural right of self-defense including the means of defense, i.e.,
firearms.3 The right of self-defense was not only the ultimate
reason the right to keep and bear arms was secured in both the
federal Bill of Rights and the constitutions of the several states
in the early American republic, but was also the philosophical
underpinning of the English right to arms4 and the collective
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.
1. For a typical statement of this reading of the Second Amendment, see Love
v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995). For
the observation that the militia movement is partly a response to this misreading of
the amendment, see Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City,
62 TENN. L. REv. 443, 452 (1995) (arguing that "the growth of the militia movement
is an unintended consequence of antigun arguments that the Second Amendment
only protects the right to belong to a militia-for that movement has its roots in
individuals who organized their militias in response to just this argument") (citation
omitted).
2. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 83 (1984).
3. See generally Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of
Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 90-93 (1992); JOYCE L. MALCOLM, To KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 162 (1994) (arguing
that self-defense was one of two goals of the Second Amendment).
4. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141-44 (describing the
right of "having" arms guaranteed by the English Bill of Rights as among the "aux-
iliary subordinate rights" that serve "to protect and maintain inviolate the three
great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private proper-
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right of resistance in the days leading to revolution.5 These
rights to have arms, which included the right to defend one's life
and liberty and to resist tyranny, received prominent mention in
the declarations of rights adopted by the states in the wake of
America's Declaration of Independence.'
In contrast to the modern tendency to think in terms of a
collective interest in having arms, the more difficult issue during
the period in which the Second Amendment was framed was
whether private citizen-based groups, other than the general
militia, had rights to organize, arm, and train themselves. Such
a claim of a collective right would have presented risks of faction
and potential rebellion against valid civil order.' If the issue of
the rights of private groups to gun ownership had squarely aris-
en in the eighteenth century, Americans would have been com-
pelled to address the difference between individual and group
ty"); MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 145 (citing American colonists relying on Blackstone
in support of the right of all Americans to hold arms for their defense).
5. See generally HALBROOK, supra note 2 (discussing that the assumption un-
derlying American revolutionary philosophy was that collective defense, including
collective resistance to tyranny, is merely individual defense of life, liberty, and prop-
erty).
6. On the right to arms, see MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. XVII (1780), reprinted in
3 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHAR-
TERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 1892
(1909); N.C. CONST. art. XVII (1776), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 2788; PA.
CONST. art. XIII (1776), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 3083 (1909); VT. CONST. ch.
I, § 15 (1777), reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra, at 3741. On the general right of self-de-
fense, see MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. I, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1889 (includ-
ing among the people's inalienable rights the rights of "defending their lives and
liberties" and "protecting property"). On the right of resistance, see, for example, MD.
CONST. art. IV (1776), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1687 (declaring that "[the
doctrine of non-resistance, against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, slavish,
and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind"). That support for the right
of resistance had not waned by the time of the ratification of the federal Constitu-
tion is shown by the Virginia Ratifying Convention's proposal for a bill of rights that
included the declaration that "the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power
and oppression is absurd[,] slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of
mankind." Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, June 27, 1788, Proposed
Decl. of Rts. Third, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD
FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 17 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds. 1991) [hereinafter
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
7. See 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (Leonard W. Levy ed. 1971) (1797). In
classic defense of American constitutions, first published on the eve of the Philadel-
phia Convention, Adams stated that guns should not be used according to "individual
discretion, except in private self-defence [sic]," because it would "demolish every consti-
tution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that liberty can be enjoyed by no man." Id.
(emphasis added). For a discussion of the relevance of Adams's views to basic Second
Amendment questions, see infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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rights to be armed. They likely would have determined that the
individual right deserved protection more than the collective
right for groups who might present a threat to the safety and
security of the community. The irony here is that while modern
thinkers debate whether the Second Amendment included an
individual right to arms, founding-era Americans would have
seen that question as the easy one, and the question of protec-
tion to private groups as the hard question.
Read in a historical context, the Second Amendment pro-
vides clear answers to only a few of the questions regarding the
appropriate limits of state regulatory power to restrict organizing
and training private militia groups. Moreover, a basic analysis of
the original materials yields conclusions that may be disappoint-
ing to both critics and sympathizers of the private militia move-
ment. Critics may be unhappy with the conclusion that the indi-
vidual right to bear arms offers important protection to at least
some activities of private militia members. Sympathizers may be
equally disappointed with the conclusion that activities which
include full-scale preparation for a military confrontation with
the government are not protected by the Second Amendment.
A less obvious irony of the militia debate is that the First
Amendment may provide the most effective means to protect
militias against intrusive state regulation. Consider that many of
those who join private militia groups object to constitutional
innovation, especially in the area of expanding civil liberties for
individuals and minorities. There is some irony in the fact that
the First Amendment doctrines that seem likely to offer signifi-
cant protection to private militia groups are among those that
might be contested as exceeding the degree of protection contem-
plated by those who adopted the First Amendment.! Ironies
8. Modern Americans have a difficult time understanding how it is that the
concept of natural-law-based limits on the exercise of natural rights, including those
rights made part of the positive fundamental law of constitutions, enabled founding-
period Americans to be equally committed to both the idea of natural rights and the
notion of a popular authority to limit the scope of those rights in the public interest.
See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Consti-
tutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 944-55 (1993) (treating the very limited scope most Amer-
icans in the founding era gave to the natural, as well as constitutional, rights of free
speech and free press based on perceived natural law limits on the valid exercise of
those freedoms). If the framers of the First Amendment intended to insulate from
legal censure public political discourse, and even criticism of government, it also
seems likely that they would have viewed advocacy of resistance to democratically
enacted laws, as in the tax-resistance movement, or the advocacy of rejection of the
jurisdiction of courts established by constitutionally prescribed methods, as with the
Freemen in Montana, as examples of unprotected "license" rather than protected
1997]
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aside, difficult questions raised by the activities of some private
militia groups may also provide the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to think more carefully about the limits previously
established concerning the freedom granted to potentially dan-
gerous advocacy groups under the First Amendment. This Article
will present in Part II how the Second Amendment may limit
regulation of private militias, and in Part III how the First
Amendment may also limit regulation of private militias. This
Article offers a suggestive rather than exhaustive approach to
how these constitutional amendments limit the extent to which
the state may regulate militia activities. The Article concludes in
Part IV that carefully applying constitutional tenets can simulta-
neously protect individual rights and the safety of the communi-
ty at large.
II. MILITIAS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. The Militia Clause of the Second Amendment
First, it is important to clarify that the clause of the Second
Amendment that might appear most relevant to the current
debate about constitutional protections for private militia groups,
the so-called Militia Clause,' is not directly relevant at all. Some
would tell us that this is because today's private militia groups
do not constitute the "militia" contemplated by the Militia
Clause.10 They may well be right. The Second Amendment re-
fers to a militia which was not a small, private group of con-
cerned citizens, but one which, in theory, was comprised of the
whole people (meaning at that time basically all adult males)."
"speech."
9. The Militia Clause of the Second Amendment states: "A wen-regulated Mili-
tia, being necessary to the security of a free state . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
10. See, e.g., Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment
in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV.
5 (1989).
11. For example, in a classic statement of militia ideology, a pseudonymous de-
fender of the proposed federal Constitution explained that Americans need not fear
the authority it granted to Congress to call out the militia because the militia "com-
prehends all the male inhabitants from sixteen to sixty years of age" and "includes
the knowledge and strength of the nation." A Letter from a Gentleman in a Neigh-
boring State to a Gentleman in this City, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 380, 389 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (1787) [hereinafter
Letter from a Gentleman]. He concluded:
Against whom will they turn their swords? Against themselves!-to execute
laws which are unconstitutional, unreasonable, and oppressive upon them-
selves! Absurdity itself could never have thought of raising an objection on
this ground .... That when Congress resort to the militia, which is the
[Vol. 58
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In theory and in practice the militia represented the community
as a whole." By contrast, today's private militias are tiny mi-
nority factions that exist on the fringes of the American commu-
nity. Far from embodying the community, these groups mistrust
the state and federal governments, which are elected and sup-
ported by most voting Americans. 3 Despite their weaknesses,
these governments enjoy perhaps stronger overall democratic
legitimacy than any governments in history. 14 While private
body of the people, for the support and execution of the laws of the Union,
it is done in confidence that the laws are just and good, and worthy of the
support of the people, otherwise Congress can have no reason to expect
support from that quarter.
Id.
12. As a conceptual matter, republican theory perceived the militia as an in-
termediate institution, standing between the citizens or subjects and the governmen-
tal regime, in much the same way as the jury was seen as a continuous popular
check on government. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitu-
tion, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1170-71 (1992) (describing the militia in contrast to stand-
ing armies inasmuch as it implied "[m]en serving alongside their families, friends,
neighbors, classmates, and fellow parishioners," suggesting that "civilian control over
the military would be beautifully internalized"; further describing the militia as "a
local institution, bringing together representative Citizens to preserve popular values
of their society"); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 637, 647 (1989) (citing sources describing the militia as consisting of "the whole
people"); id. at 650 (militia reflected a republican theory that stressed 'the value of
participation in government, as contrasted to mere representation by a distant lead-
ership"); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrify-
ing Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 554 (1991); (stating that the militia in
republican theory "constituted a forum in which state and society met and melded"
and in which "the line between state and people ideally disappeared," and stating
further that this feature is what enabled the militia to resist equally both "demagog-
ic rebellion" and the despotism of a corrupt state). In colonial America, the militia
was generally organized at the local level by cities, towns, and political districts; the
members of the militia usually elected their own officers; and there was often little
in the way of an effective command structure from above. See James Biser Whisker,
The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 947, 955
(1992). Local militias were sufficiently organized from the "ground up," as opposed to
from the "top down," that the same institutions that colonists viewed as local militias
acting to defend the rights of the colonists were viewed as unauthorized, and illegal,
forms of organized resistance by the English. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee & Michael
P. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or
Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 842 & n.200 (1997).
13. In January of 1996, it was estimated that more than 15,000 people were
connected to private militias in the United States. See Kenneth S. Stern, Militia
Mania: a Growing Danger, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 1, 1996, at 13. While some see such
figures as evidence of a growing threat, it is equally clear that the movement re-
mains a fringe element of the American political scene.
14. During the course of more than 200 years of American democracy, the
steady course of development has been toward an ever-expanding franchise. Imperfect
as they seem, American governments embody the will of the people at least as much
as any framers recognize as legitimate.
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militia members see themselves as friends of liberty, the over-
whelming majority of Americans would deny that these groups
represent, or speak with, the voice of "the people."
On a related note, some commentators contend that the
National Guard (as an entity of state government) is today the
functional equivalent of the militia contemplated by the Second
Amendment. 5 These commentators have read too much into the
text of the Second Amendment, fearing that a broad interpreta-
tion of the language would protect private militias. 6 In fact,
both clauses of the Second Amendment have direct antecedents
in the state constitutions of the early American republic, 7 and
the Militia Clause provides a general statement of civic republi-
can political theory that reflects a centuries-old preference for
citizen-based defense systems over standing armies. 8 No evi-
dence supports the view that the purpose of the Second Amend-
ment was to ensure the means by which the state governments
could protect themselves against a federal leviathan. Nor is it
clear that the framers of the Second Amendment thought of the
militia as simply an arm of the state instead of as a creature of
the people as participants in local and state government.' 9
15. See, e.g., Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 10, at 40. Indeed, it has been
contended that only an institution formed by state governments could constitute the
"militia" referred to in the Second Amendment because the central purpose of the
Amendment was to preserve the power of states to maintain their own militias and
to preclude federal abuse or neglect of the militia system of the states. See id. at 30
(contending that the sole purpose of the Second Amendment was to guarantee "the
ability of the states to maintain an effective militia").
16. For a thorough critique of the modern argument that the Second Amend-
ment is a product of the debate over the powers given the nation over the state
militias, see McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 12, at 824-29.
17. See supra note 6 (citing provisions guaranteeing the right to keep and bear
arms). See also VA. CONST. art. 13 (1776), reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 6, at
3814 (providing that '[a] well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free State"); MD.
CONST., Decl. of Rts. XXV (1776), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 6, at 1688 (sim-
ilarly worded provision); N.H. CONST. XXIV (1784), reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note
6, at 2456 (similarly worded provision).
18. For a general overview of the early American commitment to the tradition
of viewing militias as a bulwark of liberty, see MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 141-43,
150, 155-56, 159. For treatments of the relationship between the declarations favoring
militias and the right to keep and bear arms, in the state constitutions of the early
American republic as well as in the federal Constitution, see David T. Hardy, The
Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 1,
33-55 (1987); McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 12, at 852-65.
19. See McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 12, at 824-29. The existence of the state
militias was viewed as a potential check of national power, but this check ran in
favor of popular liberty more than in favor of the state governments. Indeed, the
potential of state governments to serve as organizers of resistance to federal en-
6
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There is an even more fundamental reason why the Militia
Clause does not offer significant protection to modern private
militias. The Militia Clause was a purely declaratory statement,
used to proffer a central reason to support the right guaranteed
in the Right to Arms Clause of the same amendment.0 It does
not command or prohibit anything. It does not mandate that
there be a militia at all.2 ' The Clause simply restates a funda-
mental principle of civic republican constitutional thought: a
strong preference for citizen-based militias over standing armies
as the liberty-enhancing means of collective defense.2 The basic
language of the Militia Clause had appeared in the declarations
of rights of several state constitutions.23 Advocates for a federal
bill of rights proposed to include similar language.24 The draft-
ing history of the federal Bill of Rights suggests that Madison
placed the Militia Clause first because it was a declaration of
principle. In so doing he avoided compromising his general ap-
proach, that of focussing on specific commands and prohibitions
that would fit within a Constitution of enforceable limits.25 In
croachment was seen as an added safeguard for the people.
20. See id. at 864-65.
21. As David C. Williams has noted, t]he militia is so central to republican
thinking that it is surprising that the proponents of the Amendment did not secure
a constitutional mandate for one." Williams, supra note 12, at 594. He observes that
Elbridge Gerry proposed that the Second Amendment proposal be revised "to man-
date a federal duty to assemble a militia, but his motion failed without a second and
without discussion." Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 750-51 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
22. See McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 12, at 852-53.
23. See VA. CONST. art. 13 (1776), reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 7, at
3814; N.H. CONST. art. XX1V (1784), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 7, at 2456;
MD. CONST. art. XXV (1776), reprinted in, 3 THORPE, supra note 6, at 1688.
24. See, e.g., McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 12, at 860-62 (treating Virginia's
proposed militia provision).
25. Madison is widely, and correctly, praised for developing an important inno-
vation in the statement of rights as legal commands and prohibitions in the federal
Bill of Rights, as contrasted with the general declarations of widely-shared principles
as found in the state declarations of rights. See, e.g., Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as
Constitutional Provisions 1776-1791, in CONSTITUTIONS AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, 116 (1987); Bernard Schwartz, Madison Introduces His
Amendments, May-June, 1789, in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
1008-09 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1971). Donald S. Lutz has observed that the state
declarations of rights pervasively used "language of obligation rather than com-
mand--'ought,' 'should,' etc.," and that this language sharply contrasted with lan-
guage of command found in the same constitutions' "frames of government" that
established the allocation of powers within state government). DONALD S. LUTZ, POP-
ULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 65-66 (1980). Madison's shift to the language of command,
even as contrasted with the amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions,
went together with his decision to propose inclusion of the amendments into the
body of the Constitution rather than in a "declaration of rights" that would precede
7
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short, the Militia Clause is not a command or prohibition, but is
instead a declaration of principle that reflects the tradition of
stating agreed upon principles in foundational documents, as in
the states' declaration of rights." However, the real punch of
the Second Amendment is found in the second clause, which
directly prohibits the government from infringing on the people's
right to keep and bear arms.27
B. The Right to Arms Clause of the Second Amendment
The legal guarantee of the Second Amendment is a popular
right to have and use firearms. The right to arms facilitated
personal self-defense, as well as defense of others, and was
viewed as something of a duty in an era that lacked professional
law enforcement agencies.2" The right to arms also insured that
the body of the Constitution; it also reflects his expectation that his amendments
would be understood as limiting provisions that could be enforced by courts. See
Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights "Re-
tained" by the People, 16 So. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 303-04 (1992) (describing Madison's
new emphasis on judicial review as one of the fruits of legal limitations included in
the Bill of Rights and describing statements of principle, derived from the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, that Madison proposed to add to the preamble to the Constitu-
tion rather than among the individual rights limitations to be inserted in the body of
the Constitution).
26. Indeed, this tendency to restate fundamental principles in the declarations
of rights was ridiculed by the hard-edged Alexander Hamilton. In defending the
omission of a bill of rights from the proposed Constitution, Hamilton suggested such
documents were filled with "aphorisms" that "would sound much better in a treatise
of ethics than in a constitution of government." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 536
(Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
27. The thesis about the relationship between the clauses of the Second Amend-
ment developed in text above is more comprehensively developed in McAffee &
Quinlan, supra note 12, at 852-66. The cited article demonstrates not only Madison's
unique approach to drafting the federal Bill of Rights, as described above, but, more
specifically, the manner in which Madison shifts the Right to Arms Clause from a
mere declaration of a right to a specific prohibition on government while proffering
no similar transformation of the Militia Clause. See id. At the same time, the order
of clauses is reversed from the Virginia proposal from which Madison drafted, so
that the Militia Clause is actually de-emphasized and rendered as a subordinate
clause (consistent with its status as a mere declaration of principle rather than an
enforceable guarantee). See id.
28. That the amendment was understood to refer to a private right is confirmed
by the contemporaneous statement of Trench Coxe, a prominent supporter of the
federal Constitution who was closely connected to James Madison. In June of 1789,
just one week after Madison introduced his proposed amendments in Congress, Coxe
wrote in praise of the proposed right to keep and bear arms, which, he said, "con-
firmed" the people's right "to keep and bear their private arms." Philadelphia Federal
Gazette, June 18, 1789, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 670-71
(David E. Young ed., 1991). In a single statement, Coxe clarifies that the guarantee
"confirmed" a preexisting individual right, rather than establishing a new state right
8
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the populace from which a citizen-based militia could be drawn
would have access to arms.29 Finally, an armed citizenry would
serve as a check on government tyranny and would reinforce the
right of resistance that the people possess against a government
that becomes abusive of the people's rights.30Accordingly, the
right to have and use arms for lawful purposes extended to every
adult individual, qualified only by the universally recognized
power of the state to keep firearms from convicted felons and
other clearly untrustworthy individuals.31
to maintain militias, and that it referred to the traditional right to keep "private
arms" for the purposes that individuals had traditionally kept them. For the insight
that among the legitimate uses of private arms during this period was the duty of
citizens to aid in law enforcement, either individually or as part of a posse comitatus,
see Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 143, 145 (1986) (observing that the citizen gun ownership involved "a system
under which virtually every male of military age was legally required to possess his
own arms for personal defense, crime prevention, and community defense"); Joyce Lee
Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradi-
tion, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 291-92 (1983) (offering insights into rights and
duties relating to firearms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
29. See William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236, 1244 (1994) [hereinafter The Second Amendment] (ob-
serving that the Second Amendment refers to the security of a "free state" rather
than "the security of THE STATE," in contrast to "certain national constitutions that
put a privileged emphasis on the security of 'the state;'" such provisions do not ap-
pear in a bill of rights nor include language suggesting any right to arms "apart
from state service" because such a recognition "might well pose a threat to the secu-
rity of 'the state'").
30. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 746 (1833) (contending that "[tihe right of citizens to keep and bear
arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic"
because "it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of
rulers"); Levinson, supra note 12, at 647-50 (describing what he labels the "civic re-
publican" purpose of the Second Amendment to provide an armed citizenry as a
check on tyrannous government).
31. It remains true today that a number of lower federal courts have construed
the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right only to militiamen, or under circum-
stances in which the private possession of arms directly facilitated the establishment
of a militia (circumstances that no longer exist in any state). See, e.g., Love v.
Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995); United
States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1988); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove,
695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v.
Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United
States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974). See also Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club,
Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1992) (relying on Cruikshank and
Presser, the Court refused to examine the scope of the Second Amendment, stating
that "it is for the Supreme Court, not us, to revisit the reach of the Second Amend-
ment."). Considering, however, that these cases appear to misread controlling Su-
preme Court precedent, and to do a grave disservice to the original materials, there
is growing scholarly consensus that such decisions are ripe for reconsideration. See,
e.g., Michael P. Quinlan, Is There a Neutral Justification for Refusing to Implement
the Second Amendment or is the Supreme Court Just "Gun Shy"?, 22 CAP. U. L. REV.
9
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Implicit in this right to "keep and bear" arms, and consistent
with the purposes for which it is granted, is the right to make
use of them and to become skilled in their use. For example,
from the individual right to own and use firearms, it should
follow that privately operated gun clubs are protected in the
same way that birth control and abortion clinics receive constitu-
tional protection from modern Supreme Court precedent concern-
ing the right of privacy." Firing ranges and gun clubs should
receive constitutional protection precisely because they have
standing to assert the Second Amendment rights of their mem-
bers.3 To the extent that private militia groups amount to glo-
rified private gun clubs, by encouraging their members to be-
come proficient in the use of small arms and by providing prop-
erty or facilities to accomplish this, these groups also would be
constitutionally protected. The underlying constitutional right
belongs to individual citizens who happen to join private militia
groups, but the groups would have the power to invoke the per-
sonal rights of its members to engage in constitutionally protect-
ed activity. Of course there would be limits on the constitutional
protection offered to all citizens would. The use of firearms to
violate criminal laws, or to participate in a conspiracy to do so,
would obviously be unprotected, as would violations of valid
641, 682-88 (1993) (examining the deficiencies and weaknesses of lower federal court
decisions relating to the Second Amendment); Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 1254-55
(suggesting that it is time to reconsider the Second Amendment in light of modern
historical research). It may also be questioned whether the Second Amendment would
bear on the constitutionality of state laws restricting the right to arms, inasmuch as
the Second Amendment has not yet been incorporated within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Love, 47 F.3d at 123-34. The only Supreme Court cases considering
the matter, however, were decided at a time prior to the Court's beginning a process
of selective incorporation, and there is every reason to think that the Court's applica-
tion of its own selective incorporation criteria would properly yield the incorporation
of the Second Amendment as well. See Quinlan, supra at 663-71. Incorporation doc-
trine aside, moreover, many states, including Montana, have state constitutional
guarantees of the same basic right to arms; indeed, Montana's guarantee explicitly
recognizes the right of individuals to firearms. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12 (recog-
nizing the "right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, per-
son, or property, or in aid of civil authority when thereto legally summoned").
32. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (holding that
physicians and clinics have standing to raise constitutional claims of married couples
that they serve).
33. Interestingly, the Montana statute that was drafted to prohibit "training
activities in furtherance of unlawful acts of violence," MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-107
(1995), specifically exempts from its strictures "an activity intended to teach or prac-
tice self-defense or self-defense techniques," MONT. CODE ANN. § 458-8-109(3)(f)
(1995), or "a facility, program, or lawful activity related to firearms instruction or
training intended to teach the safe handling and use of firearms." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-109(3)(g) (1995).
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firearms regulations (state or federal).
Some might question whether the rights of individuals to
arms might, in general terms, be diminished somewhat in a
group context, especially where the group is a political organiza-
tion that is ideologically charged and advocates extremist views
that many involve the threat of violence.34 However, if political
groups, including the private militias, were singled out for
unique regulatory restrictions or were completely prohibited from
gun possession in connection with group activities based purely
on their political or ideological context, such laws would almost
certainly be viewed as unconstitutional conditions on the exer-
cise of First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.
This would be unconstitutional quite apart from any Second
Amendment question.35 Moreover, even if legislation extended
to all political parties and all organizations, a general prohibition
on possession of firearms in connection with the activities of such
groups would still be invasive of rights to associate and bear fire-
arms secured by the First and Second Amendments.3"
The more significant question concerns whether there is a
point at which the activities of private militia organizations,
beyond their facilitation of personal small firearms training,
would pose the sort of threat to public safety that would justify
regulations limiting a group's activities relating to firearms not-
withstanding the Second Amendment rights of their members.
At least thirty-eight states have answered this question in the
affirmative and thus have laws that prohibit the formation of
private military units or, in other cases, various activities associ-
ated with them.37 To the extent that these restrictions have
34. See, e.g., Morris Dees, Militias Still "A Recipe for Disaster," USA WEEKEND,
April 14, 1996, at 4 (describing various unlawful acts by militia members and evi-
dence of stockpiling of homemade explosives, etc., by individuals or groups, associated
with the militia movement).
35. Cf Frost v. Railroad Comm'n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926)
(holding that government may not manipulate constitutional rights out of existence
by withholding a valuable privilege if the right is not surrendered). In such a case,
the state imposes an unconstitutional condition by in effect telling an individual that
she may exercise her freedom of political association only so far as she is willing to
give up her Second Amendment rights. Individuals should not be seen as sacrificing
a fundamental right to the means of self-defense merely by joining a political organi-
zation, and such a law would place all politically active individuals at risk. See also
infra Part III.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. I & II; William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); see
also infra Part III.
37. See R. J. Larizza, Comment, Paranoia, Patriotism, and the Citizen Militia
Movement: Constitutional Right or Criminal Conduct?, 47 MERCER L. REV. 581, 583
1997]
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been defended on the grounds that the Second Amendment se-
cures a right only to the states or to state militiamen, or that the
Second Amendment does not apply to the states, we have al-
ready discovered that those arguments stand on dubious foot-
ing.38
At the other end of the spectrum, it has been contended that
the Second Amendment should be read not only as securing "an
individual right to keep and bear arms," but also, given its "un-
derlying purpose... to provide citizens with the ability to de-
fend against government oppression," as establishing "a collater-
al right of the people to form citizen militias. '39 Because the
Second Amendment is designed to facilitate a hypothetically
necessary insurrection against tyranny, the people's right to
arms should, according to this argument, extend to any orga-
nized use of weapons that does not itself constitute a valid crime
against the state (apart from the state defining firearms posses-
sion as a crime). On this view, short of unlawful use of firearms
and criminal conspiracies, there would be no valid limits on the
use of firearms by political groups. Thus the argument goes too
far. While it is true that one purpose of providing for the right to
arms is to facilitate mass insurrection if it proves necessary, this
purpose does not define the scope of the Second Amendment
guarantee. For example, the legal right does not extend all the
way to conducting such an insurrection.' Such a move is neces-
n.6 (1996). In Montana, there is no prohibition on the formation of a private militia,
but the law does prohibit assembly "for the purpose of training in, instructing in the
use of, or practicing with any technique or means capable of causing property dam-
age, bodily injury, or death, with the purpose of employing the training instruction,
or practice in a civil disorder." MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-109(1) (1995).
38. They have been defended in precisely these terms. See, e.g., Vietnamese
Fishermen's Assoc. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 210, 216-17
(S.D. Tex. 1982); Joelle E. Polesky, Comment, The Rise of Private Militia: A First
and Second Amendment Analysis of the Right to Organize and the Right to Train,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1630-40 (1996).
39. Larizza, supra note 37, at 609.
40. Thus, a common fallacy of critics of the individual right construction of the
Second Amendment is that the argument implies a constitutional right to commit
insurrection against government. See, e.g., Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and
the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 107, 110 (1991) (claiming that the view
that the Second Amendment was intended to provide a check against state and fed-
eral tyranny "amounts to the startling assertion of a generalized constitutional right
of all citizens to engage in armed insurrection against their government;" characteriz-
ing this "insurrectionist theory" as a "profoundly dangerous doctrine of unrestrained
individual rights" that would "threaten the rule of law itself"). However, the recogni-
tion that armed revolt might prove to be a necessity in reasserting popular sover-
eignty over a government bent on imposing tyranny does not amount to a claim of
constitutional right to insurrection, let alone to all the means necessary to accom-
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sarily an extra-legal act, not to mention a step of last resort.
Similarly, the logic of the text read in historical context estab-
lishes that the right to "bear" arms necessarily is limited to
weapons that an individual can carry, thus precluding use of
heavy military weapons, even if essential to a modern armed
revolt." The right to arms does not translate into a right of
revolution, or to a right to everything that might be essential to
successfully launching one.
Moreover, there is a tradition that suggests a group right to
bear arms which dates back to John Adams, who drafted the
Massachusetts State Constitution's guarantee of a right to keep
and bear arms. This tradition recognizes that a private group's
use of firearms at some point presents a different question from
the personal use of firearms in self-defense. The provision draft-
ed by Adams stated that "[t]he people have a right to keep and
bear arms for the common defense."42 While some objected that
the focus on "common defense" failed to clarify that the right was
also intended for self-defense,' the historical evidence suggests
that Adams drafted the provision to foreclose the invocation of a
right to employ arms by factional groups within society and yet
provide for the right to keep private arms for self-defense." In
one of his most important constitutional works, Adams stated
the view that firearms should not be used according to "individu-
al discretion, except in private self-defense," because it would
plish it.
41. See Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue; 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 146-48 (1986).
42. MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. XVII (1780), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 6,
at 1892.
43. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 134-35 (1986) (emphasizing that communities objected that
the arms provision "is not expressed with that ample and manly openness and lati-
tude which the importance of the right merits" and demanded the inclusion of lan-
guage reflecting that it is "an essential privilege to keep Arms in Our Houses for
Our own Defence'). While these communities correctly observed that the arms guar-
antee could have more clearly indicated that the right extended to private uses such
as self-defense, Habrook points out that the right to keep arms in private homes
seems clearly contemplated by the right "to keep and bear arms." See HALBROOK,
supra note 2, at 197.
44. For one thing, Adams was a strong supporter of the individual right to
have arms as a means of self-defense. See HALBROOK, supra note 2, at 58 (reviewing
Adams' record as an attorney and a revolutionary leader supporting the established
English right to have firearms for self-defense). For another thing, Adams was equal-
ly the draftsman of the guarantee of the people's right of "defending their lives and
liberties" and "protecting property," a guarantee that hardly suggests a lack of in-
terest in securing the private right of self-defense. MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. I (1780),
reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 6, at 1889.
1997]
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"demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that
liberty can be enjoyed by no man."45 Adams apparently feared
the potential for illicit collective employment of arms by private
armies, which presented the dangers of unlawful mob actions
and illegitimate insurrections.4
Instead, a more plausible and logical argument for recogniz-
ing a right of groups to "keep and bear" arms would be that the
right of self-defense belongs to groups as much as it does to indi-
viduals. Arguably, if an advocacy group has a constitutionally
protected right to exist under the First Amendment, such a
group ought to be able to have and use arms for the same legiti-
mate, defensive purpose for which individuals possess a right to
arms.47 It is difficult to be certain that Adams' views in opposi-
tion to a private group's rights to use firearms were necessarily
predominant at the time of the adoption of the Second Amend-
ment. While the differences in language can easily be overstated,
the text of the Second Amendment, unlike that of the
Massachusetts Constitution defended by Adams, does not limit
the purpose of the right to arms to that of "collective defense" (of
the people as a whole or of the state).4" The omission of this
45. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (reprint of 3d ed., 1797); see also, Application of
Cassidy, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944), affd, 73 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1947)
(existence of "organized private militia" poses threat of "prevent[ing] a democratic
form of government, such as ours, from functioning freely, without coercion, and in
accordance with the constitutional mandates"); Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc. v.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 209 (1982) (citing Cassidy).
46. Adams thus wrote that the militia is "created, directed and commanded by
the laws, and ever for the support of the laws." 3 ADAMS, supra note 45, at 475.
Notice, however, that Adams' concern about the potential for lawless mob action, and
his insistence that the militia exists to support the laws, does not preclude the possi-
bility of the general militia, or an armed populace, serving to check tyranny. The
idea of a right to resistance presumed an aroused populace, not a mere faction, act-
ing against a fundamentally lawless government, a regime bent on usurping consti-
tutional and legal authority and on destroying the constitutional order itself.
47. See, e.g., JOHN FALTER & DON B. KATES, JR., THE NECESSITY OF ACCESS TO
FIREARMS BY DISSENTERS AND MINORITIES WHOM GOVERNMENT IS UNWILLING OR
UNABLE TO PROTECT, IN RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT
185, 186-87 (Don B. Kates ed., 1979) (recounting instances of the necessary use of
arms for self-defense during the American Civil Rights Movement). In fact, there is
room for doubt whether in general there is any need to distinguish between a group
and individual right of arms for self-defense; presumably the individual right would
protect the legitimate self-defense interests of all the members of an advocacy group.
The real question is whether various sorts of group activities, including the formation
of military units and training in military tactics falls within, or might be viewed as
exceeding, the right to have firearms for self-defense guaranteed by the right to keep
and bear arms.
48. Compare MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. XVII (1780), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra
14
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qualifying language could merely reflect the preference to avoid
any inference against a right to private arms for self-defense.
However, it is at least possible that this absence reflects support
for the broadest sort of right to keep and bear arms provided to
individuals and groups, subject only to the customary limits on
those who were unfit to have arms and other regulations essen-
tial to prevent the abuse of firearms.49
Perhaps the more fundamental point is that there is no
reason to think that the Second Amendment was intended to
recognize an absolute right to the employment of firearms-for
an individual or group-beyond the right of self-defense and
defending the community as a whole. ° However, while history
is hardly decisive for purposes of analyzing state regulatory
authority, good reason exists for distinguishing between an indi-
vidual and a group right to keep and bear arms. An armed and
trained group or faction, especially one that is fairly character-
ized as a private army, is far more likely to pose a serious threat
to public peace and safety than an individual who owns and is
trained in the use of a gun." For example, state laws that have
note 7, at 1892 ("The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common
defense"), with U.S. CONST. amend. II ("the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed").
49. It might also be contended that, given the demise of the formal militia
structure, as well as the rise of the modem professional army, the right to arms
guarantee should be given an especially broad construction in our modern era. It is
true that Madison and others predicted that the armed citizen militias of the states
could easily overwhelm the assumedly small national military force if the national
government ever were to overstep its bounds. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at
297-98 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888); Letter from a Gentleman, supra note 11, at
389. Arguably the only hope a citizens' revolt might have in the modern era, and
thus the only meaningful check on government the right to arms is likely to supply,
would not exist unless the Second Amendment is construed to give broad power to
private militias to prepare for such a day. Some would, of course, question the idea
of an armed citizenry as an important check on government in the modern era, how-
ever much protection is offered to private groups by the Second Amendment. See,
e.g., Charles J. Dunlop, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrec-
tionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643 (1995). A more effec-
tive point may be that, original meaning aside, the contemplated political check to be
supplied by an armed citizenry is only likely to be effective in a political era in
which distrust of government leads to popular insistence on broad legislative
protections for the use of guns by private groups or the establishment of a bona fide
citizen militia. But don't hold your breath.
50. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amend-
ment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 315 (1991); Don
B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 257-84 (1983); Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 1253-54.
51. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886) (the state's exercise of
the power "to control and regulate the organization, drilling, and parading of military
bodies and associations" is "necessary to the public peace, safety and good order").
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historically prohibited private groups from parading under
arms52 seem reasonably designed to preserve peace and to pre-
vent violence. After all, even the First Amendment guarantee of
clearest relevance safeguards only the right "peaceably to assem-
ble."53 This description hardly fits the picture of an armed group
parading down main street. While courts have upheld the power
of states to forbid individuals from carrying firearms without a
permit (especially when concealed),54 the case in favor of up-
holding such limits on groups seems far more compelling.
Surely, governmental regulations should constitutionally be
required to focus on questions of substance rather than on no-
menclature. To the extent that a political advocacy group styles
itself a "militia," but functions essentially as an ideologically
driven "gun club," the Second Amendment rights of its members
should give the group constitutional protection for gun-related
activities. It is not reasonable to think that the constitutional
rights of such a group's members would go by the boards because
they all wear army fatigues while they practice or receive in-
struction in the use firearms. Members of political groups do not
sacrifice their individual right of self-defense by virtue of their
political association. As will develop subsequently, private militia
groups may also receive protection from the First Amendment.55
On the other hand, such groups could in some instances
become genuine private armies, characterized by a meaningful
military command structure, stockpiling of significant stores of
weapons, and systematic military training and drilling in the
tactics of warfare (which are likely to include techniques of ter-
rorism associated with guerrilla warfare that citizen armies
almost inevitably must employ). Under such circumstances, leg-
islation prohibiting the creation of private armies, or the training
of private military units, should be held applicable and constitu-
tionally valid.56 The lines between the individual's constitution-
52. See, e.g., id. at 262 (referring to challenged Illinois statute making it unlaw-
ful "to drill or parade with arms").
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 5.
54. See, e.g., Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) (upholding law prohibiting
concealed carrying of various weapons); Aymette v. State, 2 Tenn. (1 Hum.) 154
(1840) (upholding law prohibiting the concealed carrying of bowie knives).
55. See infra Part III.
56. In fact, a number of the statutes prohibiting the formation or training of
private armies are limited by a requirement of unlawful purpose to which the organi-
zation or training is directed. See Polesky, supra note 38, at 1609 (citing statutes).
While this article does not contend that such limiting language is required by the
Second Amendment, such an approach may well strike an appropriate balance be-
tween public security needs and the interest such groups have in freedom to advo-
[Vol. 58
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ally protected right to own and use firearms and to associate
with like-minded others and the creation of private armies that
the state is empowered to prohibit may not always be easy to
draw. Yet even without the aid of text or history, line-drawing
here need not prove any more difficult than line-drawing in
many other areas of constitutional law.57
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment bears on the authority to regulate
private militias not only because of the free speech rights of
militia members, but also because the Amendment guarantees a
right of political association.58 While the rights of speech and
association are closely related to each other, potential militia
regulations may raise questions concerning each of these First
Amendment freedoms.
A. Protected Speech and Association: Some Fundamentals
The right to free speech provides militia groups with a con-
stitutional right basis to advocate radical political ideas,59
preach government conspiracy theories, advocate preparation for
some doomsday scenario, and even choose to spread messages of
hate and prejudice." They can also parade and demonstrate on
cate vigilance and to prepare for feared governmental abuses.
57. It has been contended, moreover, that some statutory prohibitions on the
formation of private militias might be void because of their vagueness in failing to
provide adequate notice of what constitutes a proscribed "militia" or "military organi-
zation." See Larizza, supra note 37, at 600. The point is well taken, provided it is
also understood that "such a broad and unconstitutional reading of the associational
ban could be avoided if its prohibitions were narrowly construed to accommodate
constitutionally protected activities." Id. For treatment of the analogous First
Amendment overbreadth issue, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (noting
that an individual's right to speak, worship, and petition government "could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State, unless a correlative freedom to
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed").
59. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that "the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to for-
bid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action").
60. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (stating that the
First Amendment does not permit the state "to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects"); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414 (1989) (stating that "a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment" is
"that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197
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behalf of these views."' These rights have been extended to
many unpopular groups before the militias. First Amendment
standards reflect deep skepticism as to government's capacity to
deal fairly in policing the content of speech. 2 Thus, over time it
has become fundamental hornbook law that content-based regu-
lations of expression are subjected to the strictest scrutiny and
are presumptively unconstitutional.'
Applied to the activities of the militia, the First Amendment
clearly protects certain types of speech and expression. Private
militias have the right to call themselves "militias" and to march
in military-style uniforms. This right to name oneself is almost
certainly protected from state laws which prohibit the formation
of private militias, at least to the extent that such laws are ap-
plied to these groups simply because of their adoption of that
name. While there is no case law directly on point, it seems
likely that the right of political association extends to naming an
organization, and the right to name an organization also falls
within a right to free speech. The name of an organization is
speech, for it "convey[s] a particularized message" to be "under-
stood by those who view it."" The whole idea of a militia move-
ment embodies these major themes and concepts, including the
threat posed by big government and the need for citizen vigi-
lance in preparing to defend freedom. Thus, the First Amend-
ment protects a group when that group it identifies with the
militia movement by naming itself a "militia."
In addition to naming an organization, the use of uniforms
as symbols of readiness, preparation, solidarity, and even intense
opposition to particular policies or to government in general will
likely be treated as protected speech. This is symbolic speech in
that uniforms help spread the message of the organization by
identifying those who wear them as supporters of a particular
cause. The medium of uniform is as much the message as the
black arm bands worn by students to protest the Vietnam War
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict.' The courts would likely find that militia uniforms have
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (holding that a ban on demonstra-
tion by American Nazis in Jewish community deeply affected by holocaust violates
the First Amendment).
61. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
62. See, e.g., FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
80-86 (1982).
63. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 790-92 (2d
ed., 1988).
64. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
65. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding students' free speech rights by allowing
[Vol. 58
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both the intent and effect of conveying a message to those who
look on, just as uniforms worn by other organizations (e.g., the
American Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan) have been recognized as
methods of communication, in and of themselves."
First Amendment law also offers protection to the actual
creation of such militia organizations so that they function as
political advocacy groups rather than as tightly organized and
well-trained private armies.67 It is difficult to perceive a state
interest to stop the creation of militia organizations as such that
would be great enough to override rights to free speech and asso-
ciation. It has been suggested that a statutory prohibition on pri-
vate militias serves the neutral purpose of preventing the public
from being misled as to the true identity of the militia of the
state.68 This stated purpose could be treated as a neutral and
incidental regulation of speech-related acts rather than as a law
targeted at the content of the views being expressed. However, it
seems unlikely that the law would be upheld under the Supreme
Court's free speech test for such regulations set out in United
States v. O'Brien.69 In O'Brien, the Court upheld a prohibition
on draft card burning which was based on the non-speech pur-
poses viewed by the prohibition. In so doing, the Court set a test
requiring that the state not burden free speech more than is
essential to advance an important state interest.7" It is doubtful
that a regulation based on the concern that the name "militia" is
misleading would satisfy the O'Brien requirements in light of the
specific factors to be addressed. First, the concern of preventing
public confusion is not an especially important state interest
compared to the speech rights of those claiming a status as a
"militia." Second, it is highly doubtful that confusion by the pub-
lic as to the unofficial status of militia groups (even if they use
the name of the state in their title) is a serious problem. The
public is well aware that private citizens have so organized and
named themselves. Furthermore, the state could deal with this
confusion by means short of prohibiting groups from calling
them to wear black arm bands to protest the war in Vietnam).
66. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (treating flag burning as a
form of symbolic speech).
67. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 919 (1982).
68. See, e.g., Is Government Overstepping its Power in Regulating Militias?, DE-
TROIT NEWS, May 6, 1996, at A6. State Representatives contend that such a proposed
prohibition reflects the policy "that nobody may mislead a person into believing that
they are connected with the only organized militia in this state."
69. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
70. See id. at 377.
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themselves a legal militia, including a prohibition on acts or
statements representing that the private militia's activities have
an official or authoritative status.
B. Actions Not Protected by the First Amendment: Beyond
Association and Advocacy
Although the First Amendment offers protection to the act of
naming a group a "militia," whether the First Amendment's
protections extend to the formation of a fully functioning private
army is another issue.71 At least one commentator has suggest-
ed that the First Amendment prevents the state from prohibiting
the formation of a private army, but allows the state to proscribe
particular paramilitary activities which have the intent of caus-
ing civil disorder.7" Ironically, the same commentator found that
the Second Amendment offered no protection of any kind to pri-
vate individuals or groups.73 But to the extent that an organiza-
71. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
72. See Polesky, supra note 38, at 1612-20 (arguing that the prohibition of for-
mation of private militias would violate speech and association rights); see id. at
1621-28 (arguing that anti-paramilitary training statutes do not infringe First
Amendment freedoms); id. at 1627 (explaining that anti-training laws do not violate
First Amendment because "militia members are not prevented from verbalizing their
disenchantment" but only from "expressing it in a specific manner" that poses a
threat to public health and safety). It is possible that the author of this Comment
intended only to suggest that states may not prohibit organizations from describing
themselves in military terms, but may prohibit them from actually becoming an
effective military machine. See id. at 1616 (characterizing anti-organization statutes
as denying individuals "a fundamental means of voicing their opinions"); id. at 1618
(emphasizing that such laws deny militia members "liberty to convene as a group"
and thus "effectively deprives them of the ability to disseminate these views"). But
see id. at 1606 (emphasizing that anti-organization statutes create 'an outright ban
on the creation of private militia" while "anti-paramilitary training statutes require
proof of intent to commit a proscribed act"); id. at 1627 (emphasizing that "militia
members can band together as military entities to espouse their views legally, with-
out resorting to weapons training and military maneuvers intended to create civil
disturbances"). The difficulty created by drawing the distinction between an "organi-
zation" that is protected and "training" that may be prohibited is that an already
existing private military organization may pose at least as much of a threat as any
that may be posed by military training. The freedom being asserted by such a group
goes beyond expressive association, and the very distinction between regulations of
speech content and regulations of activities that threaten societal interests (apart
from the content of any advocacy involved) applies in the context of anti-organization
statutes as much as it does in the context of statutes prohibiting certain kinds of
training activities.
73. See id. at 1628-40. But cf., Larizza, supra note 37, at 600-18 (contending
that the First Amendment right of association secures the right of citizens' militias
to organize based in part on the perceived Second Amendment right of private citi-
zens to form themselves into militias).
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tion possesses all the characteristics of a private army, it be-
comes distinguishable from a mere advocacy organization. 4
This occurs because a fully trained military unit presents a
greater threat to society's peace and safety than does a group
that merely advocates doctrines that are considered dangerous.
When a fully trained and ready military unit advocates and
prepares for the necessity of violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, it poses a threat to civil order in the same way as specific
harmful, violent, or intimidating acts that are universally pro-
scribed by law.75 Accordingly, while the state may not be able to
directly prohibit a group of people from forming an association
which meets, advocates, and promotes political reform, it may
prohibit the formation of a private army and require that the
political advocacy organization eliminate the elements by which
it functions as a full-fledged military unit.7"
A similar question arises concerning whether freedom of
speech and assembly apply to marching with loaded or unloaded
arms. It seems especially clear that a military-style parade with
loaded weapons could be prohibited despite the First
Amendment's freedom of speech.77 It would be difficult to argue
74. A ban on a bona fide private army is thus analogous to a prohibition on
"teaching the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the President, the filching
of documents from public fies, the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and
the like." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Thus one of the nation's foremost defenders of free speech values, Justice Douglas,
recognized that even though "free speech is the rule, not the exception," there is a
valid distinction between the communication of ideas, such as teaching the tenets of
communist philosophy, including its abstract commitment to revolution, and the pro-
viding of training in "the techniques of terror to destroy the Government." Id. at 582,
585. As Professor Greenawalt has observed, even though training individuals in how
to perform violent or illegal acts may require "communicative acts" that involve
speech in an ordinary sense, they "may be treated as outside the reach of the First
Amendment because their 'action element' heavily dominates any expressive value."
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 244 (1989). By the
same token, an organization that is established, structured, equipped, and trained so
as to function as a genuine military unit has, without more, gone beyond the right
of expressive association guaranteed by the First Amendment.
75. See, e.g., Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc., 543 F. Supp. at 206-08 (describing
specific conduct involving intimidation and threats of violence against a protected
class of individuals by a private military unit).
76. See id. at 219-20 (order enjoining Ku Klux Klan from maintaining private
military force and from various related activities; not including any implication that
the organization may not otherwise continue to function as a political advocacy
group).
77. Cf Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886) (state power to regulate
"parading of military bodies and associations" is "necessary to the public peace, safe-
ty and good order" and denial of such power would preclude authority "to suppress
armed mobs bent on riot and rapine").
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that it is mere communication when a mass of people carry load-
ed weapons. Although the carrying of firearms as a military unit
is in some sense a communication of ideas,78 in most settings
the marching of a fully armed military unit would present itself
as a show of force and an implicit threat of violence.79 The pur-
pose of such a march is to affect others not by changing their
minds or beliefs, but by influencing them to act in fear of violent
consequences.
Even if armed marches were construed as symbolic speech,
the state would have little problem establishing a sufficiently
compelling interest to prohibit such marches when they present
an immediate risk of breach of the peace and infliction of vio-
lence on others.80 The state's interest is great because political
demonstrations and parades often involve high emotions and a
real risk of violence. Limits on carrying loaded weapons clearly
are designed to preserve peace rather than to silence-or even to
blunt-the impact of speakers and their message. A prohibition
on the mass carrying of firearms constitutes an appropriate time,
place, or manner restriction that narrowly advances an impor-
tant state purpose.
The same basic analysis would probably also justify a prohi-
bition on parading with unloaded firearms. Such a prohibition
would be upheld because it is the only practical way to prevent
loaded weapon parades. The incidental impact of such a prohibi-
tion on the content of the message to be communicated would be
justified by important government purposes and the lack of rea-
sonable alternatives to such a prohibition.
C. The Militias, Anti-Syndicalism, and the Brandenburg Test
for Illegal Advocacy
The private militia movement may supply courts with the
opportunity to further define the limits within which the state
may constitutionally impose upon the advocacy of violent or
unlawful conduct. Federal and state statutes that prohibit advo-
cacy of "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terror-
ism" to effectuate political or industrial reform remain on the
78. See SCHAUER, supra note 62, at 92-93.
79. GREENAWALT, supra note 74, at 249 (arguing that threats are situation-al-
tering utterances in which the "speaker" seeks to "do something rather than to say
something;" hence they should come within the principle of free speech).
80. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that First Amendment
secures only the right "peaceably to assemble").
[Vol. 58
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books.81 These statutes have recently been used to prosecute
antigovernment individuals who are associated with the national
militia movement. s2 In Brandenburg v. Ohio,"3 the United
States Supreme Court held that such statutes infringe on First
Amendment freedoms if they are read as prohibiting mere advo-
cacy of the view that unlawful acts or violent confrontation with
government is necessary.' This type of advocacy, which does
not present any clear and present danger of a serious evil, is not
within the government's power to prevent.s However, to fully
understand how courts should address such statutes aimed at
anti-government groups, it is necessary to review the scope of
the Supreme Court's holding in Brandenburg.
1. The Brandenburg Enigma
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court stated that criminal
sanctions for advocacy of law-breaking or violence will pass mus-
ter under the First Amendment only "where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."" Consequently, a num-
ber of commentators have concluded that after Brandenburg,
criminal syndicalism statutes are either superfluous or per se
unconstitutional. Such statutes are superfluous to the extent
they can be validly read as prohibiting conspiracies and incite-
ments to commit criminal acts because these unprotected speech
acts already constitute the separate offenses of conspiracy, solici-
81. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1969) (quoting Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute under review in that case); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-
105 (1995).
82. For example, two such cases were filed in Montana in 1995. State v. F. Joe
Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct. Mont. fied June 26, 1995); State v. Calvin K.
Greenup, No. CR-95-52 (21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed May 2, 1995).
83. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
84. See id. at 447-48.
85. See id. at 447. This rejection of state power to ban the teaching of an ab-
stract duty to break the law or to violently overthrow government is itself a signifi-
cant step toward ensuring a fairly strong principle of freedom of speech. See
SCHAUER, supra note 62, at 190 (observing that "superficially" it might appear that
advocacy of violent or unlawful means to bring about change should not be protected
because "speech that produces extra-legal change undermines the process of rational
deliberation that is the a priori value of a democratic system"). While some have
thus suggested that even abstract advocacy of violent and unlawful means should not
be protected by the First Amendment, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20, 30-31 (1971), what follows as-
sumes that the Supreme Court correctly weighted this general issue in favor of a
robust principle of free speech.
86. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted).
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tation or incitement.87 If they are given a broader construction
based on the language purporting to prohibit mere advocacy,
such statutes are unconstitutional on their faces because the
constitutional test set forth in Brandenburg precludes liability
for advocacy that falls short of direct incitement to criminal
behavior.88
However, there are reasons to be skeptical of reading
Brandenburg as a definitive standard of constitutional limits.
Primarily, the Court in Brandenburg implied that a questionable
statute could still be valid if narrowly construed and applied to
the right factual patterns.89 The Court underscored that the
statute under consideration had not been narrowly applied to fit
within the Court's prior formulations of the scope of protected
speech.9 ° Moreover, the challenged statute had been applied to
speech that was given by a single speaker on a single occasion,
which presented a clear example of abstract advocacy that did
not appear to be aimed at bringing about the commission of
unlawful acts.9' Finally, the Court went out of its way to cite
prior decisions upholding criminal syndicalism convictions, in-
cluding the conviction of communist party leaders in Dennis v.
United States,92 as though to reaffirm that it was not precluding
the possibility that such statutes would continue to have valid
applications, if narrowly construed and applied to the right fac-
tual patterns.93
87. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754-55
(1975) (reading Brandenburg as establishing a speech-protective standard that would
require criminal incitement presenting a real chance of success before speech might
be limited).
88. This is the basic thesis of Lawrence F. Reger, Note, Montana's Criminal
Syndicalism Statute: An Affront to the First Amendment, 58 MONT. L. REV. 287
(1997). For the view that such statutes should be unconstitutional on their face, but
suggesting that Brandenburg does not clearly state such a conclusion, see Hans A.
Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Con-
certo, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970). See also id. at 1186 (suggesting that anti-
syndicalism statutes previously upheld might survive Brandenburg, but only under "a
tightly restricted interpretation").
89. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (stating that the federal statute reviewed
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) was upheld, despite its text's appar-
ent prohibition of mere advocacy, "on the theory" that it embodied a principle requir-
ing a real danger of lawless action).
90. Id. at 448-49 (observing that "[n]either the indictment nor the trial judge's
instructions to the jury in any way refined the statute's bald definition of the crime
in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless
action").
91. See id. at 446-47.
92. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
93. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
[Vol. 58
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It can thus be argued that an important issue is left unre-
solved by the terse opinion in Brandenburg. The issue is whether
the Court's First Amendment test requiring the state to show
that the speech was directed to produce "imminent" lawless
action "is to apply to the group as well as the individual speak-
er." 4 Some would likely doubt that the question is reserved, as
it appears that the Court's opinion in Brandenburg states the
limits of regulating advocacy without clearly creating different
standards for group and individual advocacy.
However, immediately after stating the standard, the Court
quoted its own prior reasoning that the abstract teaching of
either the propriety of the use of force or the violation of law "is
not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling
it to such action."95 The quoted language may merely under-
score the lower court's mistake in upholding a conviction that
was outside the permissible boundaries of state regulatory au-
thority under existing case law. However, at the same time the
Court's language had the effect of raising the question of wheth-
er "the Court regarded Brandenburg as an instance of individual
speech and hence preserved the group/individual distinction."6
AMERICA 233 (1988). It is possible that the Court simply relied on prior authority to
present an image of continuity rather than abrupt departure, and reduced Dennis to
its bare facts to avoid overruling it. Kalven observes that "[o]ne can only speculate
as to the reasons for the Court's unwillingness to overrule Dennis." Id.
One speculation was that "so radical a course would not have commanded a
majority." Id Another more insightful speculation was that the leading precedent
suggested that a more speech-protective stance was in form a construction of both
the Dennis case and the federal syndicalism statute it upheld. See Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (emphasizing the concreteness of the advocacy in distin-
guishing protected abstract advocacy from unprotected advocacy as a principle of
action in the future). See KALVEN supra, at 211-20 (analyzing Yates and related post-
Dennis developments). The preference for not appearing to make up an entirely new
rule whole-cloth could have prompted the Court to retain Dennis simply as a vehicle
of reliance upon the speech-protective decisions that purported to follow it. This in-
terpretation is supported by the fact that the actual holding in Dennis seems difficult
to square with the speech-protective formulation of the constitutional test set forth in
the Brandenburg opinion. As Kalven observes, the Court in Brandenburg "explicitly
rejects the general advocacy standard which Dennis implicitly endorsed." Id. at 232.
94. Id. at 233. More specifically, Kalven wonders whether the Court could have
"wanted to preserve Dennis, so that it would be available as a precedent in the fu-
ture should a case arise involving a group possessing the characteristics ascribed to
the Communist Party in the 1950s." Id.
95. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
297-98 (1961)). Moreover, the Court went on to equate the standard articulated in its
own opinion with its formulation in Noto by stating that statutes that failed "to
draw this distinction" would violate the Constitution. Id.
96. KALVEN, supra note 93, at 234. Kalven observes that the post-Dennis cases
had attempted to formulate an "incitement" standard for defining the limits of reg-
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Such a view cuts against the view that the Court recast its earli-
er decisions to create a general "imminence" requirement that
operated to "erase any such distinction.""
In addition to a textual basis, there is doctrinal ground for
thinking that Brandenburg may not provide a definitive stan-
dard as to constitutional limits. In Dennis, especially as explicat-
ed in subsequent cases, the Court recognized the power of gov-
ernment to limit advocacy of future conduct by presuming that
the state may be able to show that a particular advocacy group's
speech acts go beyond bare advocacy and are instrumental to a
criminal enterprise which gears itself to unlawful and violent
acts in order to effectuate political change. 8 This possibility of
seditious speech in the context of criminal enterprise may pro-
vide a realistic explanation as to why the Court in Brandenburg
was unwilling to reconsider Dennis. Critics observe that the evi-
dence about the Communist party did not warrant such a conclu-
sion in Dennis.9 Even so, the Brandenburg Court confronted a
specific instance of advocacy by a single individual and did not
purport to present a standard establishing constitutional limits
of enterprise liability. For example, the opinion does not limit
the circumstances under which individuals may be convicted of
criminal conspiracy. Yet the traditional law of conspiracy, which
generally applies to private "speech" agreements, has never re-
quired a relationship of "imminence" between the conspiracy and
the unlawful act."°' It seems quite unlikely that Brandenburg
ulation, "but incitement adjusted to meet the problem of a group that is being orga-
nized to act not immediately but in the future." Id. Kalven thus suggests that the
legal standard during the era preceding Brandenburg included an "implicit" dis-
tinction between group and individual speech. See id.
97. Id. Professor Kalven accurately observed that the above quotation "resonates
to the concern with the dangers of group advocacy that informed Dennis." Id.
98. As Kalven observes, because the Court in Dennis concluded that "the de-
fendants are envisaged as a conspiracy to overthrow," it found no "need to look at
the speech for which they were indicted." KALVEN, supra note 93, at 199. He con-
cludes that "the anomaly of Dennis is that the defendants were charged with talking
but convicted for acting." Id.
99. See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 93, at 199 (noting that "the deep suspicion is
that the Government could not have satisfied anyone with its proof of a literal con-
spiracy to overthrow"); id. at 217 (observing that the proof Justice Harlan reviewed
in Yates and found insufficient was essentially the same evidence the government put
on in Dennis "after years of investigation"). In fact, when the distinction between
abstract doctrinal advocacy and organizing for concrete action in the future was given
real substance in subsequent cases the government gave up the attempt to prosecute
communists as members of a criminal syndicate. See id. at 220.
100. With respect to "conspiracy," the element of agreement to commit a crime
adds a dimension that goes beyond First Amendment expressive association and in-
creases the likelihood that criminal acts will be performed as compared to advocacy
[Vol. 58
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will be read to require "imminent lawless action" as a prerequi-
site to liability for conspiracy.
The ultimate question is whether there might be circum-
stances in which criminal syndicalism statutes could constitu-
tionally be applied. For example, could they be used to prosecute
members of an tight-knit "advocacy" group that also operates as
a criminal enterprise engaged in a pervasive pattern of criminal
(including violent) behavior that resists and undermines the
authority of government? It can be argued that, even if it could
be so read, Brandenburg should not be construed to support such
a result for three reasons. First, these statutes were originally
adopted to apply to advocacy perceived as inherently dangerous,
not to criminal enterprise. 1 Thus the statutes do not include
limiting provisions or safeguards to prevent abusive prosecution.
Second, there is a serious risk that individuals committed to a
political cause, but not to the criminal plans or goals of others,
would be found guilty by association when political groups are
prosecuted as a criminal enterprise. Finally, it is not clear that
syndicalism statutes would actually provide law enforcement an
essential tool to combat special problems of political organiza-
tions with unlawful goals. Arguably, government does not need
the tool of criminal syndicalism when it is able to adequately
prevent violent and unlawful acts by prosecuting individuals who
commit crimes themselves, are accomplices to crimes," 2 or par-
that amounts to simple encouragement. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 74, at
239-40. A related. point, suggestive that Brandenburg should not be read as pre-
senting an all-purpose test with respect to advocacy of unlawful conduct, is that the
opinion does not even consider distinctions that might plausibly be drawn between
non-ideological and ideological encouragement of unlawful acts and between encour-
agement in private settings versus public contexts (such as political speeches). See id.
at 261-72 (suggesting grounds for somewhat different tests for balancing free speech
versus crime prevention in various contexts). The Brandenburg opinion's formulation
of the test for limiting free speech should thus be read most confidently as ad-
dressing the sort of case that was squarely before it-public ideological advocacy by a
particular individual of possible future conduct. See also infra note 102 (exploring the
concept of "accessory" status for having specifically encouraged another individual to
commit a crime; concluding that Brandenburg would not apply).
101. See, e.g. Linde, supra note 88, at 1176-78.
102. Thus, in situations involving a pattern of unlawful conduct by a close-knit
group, the sort of evidence required to show "active membership," including a specific
intent to further the group's unlawful goals, might well provide the basis for an
inference of an individual's status as an accessory to specific crimes. Prosecutors
might be trying to find a basis to prosecute an individual who has not committed a
specific criminal act but is: (1) "actively involved" in a group's activities; (2) verbaliz-
ing his concurrence with its strategies and tactics; and (3) often present when unlaw-
ful acts are performed. In such a case, however, the evidence that would support the
conclusion that the individual in question held a "specific intent" to further the un-
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ticipate in criminal conspiracies." 3
Despite the strong policy arguments that criminal
syndicalism statutes are entirely unnecessary, it remains true
that in Brandenburg the Supreme Court did not dismiss all
syndicalism statutes as constitutionally infirm, but rather sug-
gested that such statutes could withstand First Amendment
scrutiny if narrowly construed to reach only unprotected forms of
criminal advocacy.' °4 Although the statutes have no safeguards
within them that prevent abusive prosecution, the Supreme
Court has a history of reading relatively strict First Amendment-
based limitations into the provisions that make it a crime to be a
member in an organization that is engaged in prohibited "advo-
cacy."0 5 One such requirement prevents a conviction of "guilty
by association" by requiring that a defendant be an active mem-
ber who knows of the unlawful goals and has a specific intent to
act in furtherance of such goals.'
Perhaps the most fundamental and compelling objection to
criminal syndicalism laws is that they are not necessary enough
to warrant the threat they pose to free expression and associa-
tion. It is especially likely that individuals of varying levels of
commitment and varying beliefs will be associated with each
other within these ideologically-based groups.0 7 The "member-
lawful goals of the group could equally support an inference that his presence at the
time of the commission of a crime reflected his status as an accomplice. See, e.g.,
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScooT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.7 (2d ed. 1986) (ob-
serving that although an individual's mere presence at the time of a crime does not
raise an inference of an intent to give aid as needed so as to establish the non-actor
as an accomplice, "circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to permit the jury to
find that such an agreement did exist" even if no act of aid was actually performed).
Another useful comment with respect to accomplice liability is that, once crimi-
nal acts are performed by members of a group, others in the group may be liable to
the extent that they encouraged the commission of that specific offense. See id. §
6.6(c). As observed above, it seems likely that if such encouragement took place in
private in the context of discussing furthering shared goals, rather than in a public
forum focused on general ideology, the Brandenburg standard requiring that the
unlawful act be "imminent" should not apply. See supra note 100. Indeed, taking the
next step in the context of a joint enterprise as reflected in a close-knit group, evi-
dence of such encouragement, even in a more public setting, should be admissible to
aid in establishing an intent to specifically encourage specific individuals to commit
particular crimes.
103. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 74, at 239-41.
104. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
105. See KALVEN, supra note 93, at 244-53 (treating this series of cases).
106. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972) (requiring that the gov-
ernment show "a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims").
107. These ideologically based groups contrast with the organized crime enter-
prises targeted by RICO.
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ship" standards set out by the courts do not eliminate the risk
that individuals who share some concerns and commitment with
a group with unlawful goals could be lumped with others in a
criminal prosecution. Even so, it may well be that in cases in-
volving relatively small, close-knit groups, individuals who did
not perform specific criminal acts, but were actively engaged in
the group's activities, may be found criminally responsible in an
appropriate case.
Consideration of the scope of freedom of speech and associa-
tion is important to the context of criminal syndicalism statutes
because the insight and reasoning derived from this consider-
ation might be applied to situations where there is a question of
civil liability of advocacy groups. For example, in the years since
Brandenburg, the Supreme Court has found itself engaged in the
task of sorting First Amendment and competing values in order
to draw a distinction between collective action involving the valid
exercise of First Amendment rights and actions that pose a suf-
ficient threat to important interests to warrant civil injunctive
relief."s A related problem is the extent to which violent or un-
lawful activity may be attributed to the collective enterprise, its
leaders, or its members in a way consistent with freedom of asso-
ciation. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that scat-
tered acts of violence or other unlawful behavior done in connec-
tion with First Amendment activities may not be attributed to
the collective enterprise if these actions were not ordered by an
organization's leadership.1" However, at the same time, the
Court has warned that pervasive violent conduct might warrant
both broad injunctive relief and the attribution of such violence
to the collective enterprise without regard to "the technicalities
of the law of agency."" ° One message the Court has sent by
way of these decisions is that Brandenburg's "imminent lawless
action" test should not be seen as the only test for determining
108. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (uphold-
ing First Amendment freedom to use consumer boycott as a tool for promoting civil
rights goals), with International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied International, 456
U.S. 212 (1982) (finding the union's refusal to handle cargoes arriving from the Sovi-
et Union to protest the invasion of Afghanistan as a prohibited secondary boycott
that the government may forbid).
109. See Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 923-26.
110. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 295 (1941). The Court in that case upheld an injunction of all
picketing, not merely violent picketing, based on its upholding of findings of perva-
sive violence in connection with the underlying strike. See id. at 296. Milk Wagon
Drivers was cited with approval in Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 US. at 923.
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the boundary between protected speech and association on one
side, and criminal and civil responsibility on the other.
2. Advocacy of Unlawful or Violent Conduct and the Private
Militia Movement
As with most groups involved in radical political movements,
the militias have engaged in political discourse, ranging from
statements of pure political ideology to predictions and advocacy
of violent confrontation with government."' However, the ma-
jority of cases concern predictions and advocacy that are exactly
the sort of abstract political advocacy long protected by the First
Amendment. These statements are not generally made in a con-
text in which they appear to be intended or likely to produce
imminent violence or serious unlawful conduct. While statements
of abstract political advocacy may add to a climate of distrust
and have some effect on the potential for anti-government
violence," the Supreme Court has properly concluded that the
way to remedy or counteract ugly or dangerous ideas is political
discourse.
Although abstract advocacy is protected by the First Amend-
ment, it is clear that when members of political advocacy groups
actually engage in threats and acts of violence their behavior is
not civil discourse and they may be punished for criminal mis-
conduct."' Criminal misconduct occurs when anti-government
111. See generally Larizza, supra note 37, at 589-93. A militia "manual" predicts
an armed conflict because government leaders have "betrayed, abused, and ignored
their oath of office to protect and uphold the Constitution of the United States." Id.
at 590 (quoting MANUAL FOR THE STANDARDIZATION OF THE MIL4IA AT LARGE 2 (un-
dated)). A leader states that "the only thing standing between some of the current
legislation being contemplated and armed conflict is time." Id. (quoting The Militia
Movement in the United States, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technol-
ogy, and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
103 (1995) (statement of J.J. Johnson, Ohio Unorganized Militia).
112. This concern has been expressed in the case of the Oklahoma City bombing.
Larizza, supra note 37, at 592 (quoting Senator Kohl's expression of concern that the
hatred expressed by anti-government groups "is particularly disturbing in light of the
escalating political violence in our country").
113. Violent acts, whether performed in attempting to further political goals or
not, indisputably exceed the protection offered by the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 916. Some have occasionally suggested that
Brandenburg's "imminence" requirement applied even to direct and serious threats of
violence or even to solicitations of violence. See, e.g., People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr.
488 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980) (holding that a criminal charge for solic-
itation in a public offer of five hundred dollars to any one who killed or maimed a
member of the American Nazi Party required a showing of "imminence" pursuant to
Brandenburg; concluding nonetheless that the standard was met in this case because
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groups stalk law enforcement agents, make death threats
against various government agents, and commit violence against
officials who have refused to comply with their demands."
Furthermore, individuals who commit criminal acts that are not
expressive are not insulated from criminal or civil prosecution by
the fact that they happen to be a member of a political advocacy
group and conceive their criminal acts as advancing the political
cause of that group.
In a few settings, most notably in Montana, Brandenburg's
perplexing questions concerning criminal enterprise and First
Amendment freedom are likely to be relevant to prosecutions
under state anti-syndicalism statutes. In some cases the "incite-
ment" standard of Brandenburg is not met, but there is also
overwhelming evidence of a group's pervasive law-breaking, in
the form of serious threats, intimidation, and resistance to legal
orders."' However, it may be difficult to prove that a particular
group member either agreed or acted to further unlawful goals,
even if that individual was physically present during the perfor-
mance of criminal acts and it is possible to establish the
individual's legal status as an active member of the group. In
cases such as this, where the "incitement" standard of
Brandenburg is not met, the question remains as to whether a
criminal syndicalism charge could validly be substituted for
charges of conspiracy or prohibitions against aiding and abetting.
As summarized above, " ' critics of such criminal prosecutions
would undoubtedly raise the serious issue of whether it is appro-
of the seriousness of the crime). The better view, however, is that serious threats of
violence, especially when used to coerce another party, do not constitute the sort of
discourse the First Amendment was designed to protect. See GREENAWALT, supra note
74, at 251. The real question in cases like Rubin, cited above, should be whether the
threat is real and serious rather than merely political hyperbole. See, e.g., Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (conviction for threatening the President over-
turned where petitioner stated as political hyperbole that, if forced to carry a rifle,
President Johnson would be the first person in his sights). Thus the language em-
ployed by the defendant in Brandenburg might be described by some as threatening,
with its vague references to potential "revengeance" that might be visited on the
nation's leaders if his political message was not heeded; but the Court properly
would have viewed the speech as a vague prediction of future developments rather
than a true threat. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446-47 (1969). The Rubin case was
challenging in this regard mainly because Mr. Rubin reiterated at least twice that he
was "deadly serious" and that the offer was not "said in jest." Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr.
at 490.
114. See, e.g., Larizza, supra note 37, at 593.
115. Nick Murnion, Garfield County Attorney, Address at the James R. Browning
Symposium, University of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5, 1996).
116. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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priate to use the anti-syndicalism statute in this manner."'
Appellate courts will struggle with these issues as such prosecu-
tions make their way through the courts.
Regardless of how these particular anti-syndicalism statutes
fare in the courts, an important warning gained from the previ-
ous discussion is that Brandenburg should not be used as an all-
purpose test for measuring the constitutional protection offered
to anti-government individuals and groups. For example, it has
been plainly suggested that Brandenburg presents a formidable
barrier to proposed legislation making it a federal offense to
train in "weapons" or "techniques" with the intention of opposing
government or for any unlawful purpose."' While several prof-
fered criticisms of the proposed law have considerable merit, the
argument that, under Brandenburg, all speech acts of political
association-short of criminal acts or conspiracies-are protected
by the First Amendment unless they incite imminent lawless
activity, is meritless."' Although Brandenburg has come to
symbolize that the depth of our national commitment to freedom
of speech goes so far as to include protection of advocacy that
aims to undermine the freedoms provided by our democratic sys-
tem, the Brandenburg tests should not be used to protect politi-
cally motivated speech acts that threaten peace and social order
rather than promote the ends that the First Amendment was
constructed to protect.
117. A participant at the Symposium, for example, offered the suggestion that
the inability to make a compelling showing of specific agreement or overt acts in
support of criminal misconduct arguably raised an inference that the individual in
question was simply not guilty of committing any crime beyond being associated
with, and perhaps holding sympathy with, the views and goals of lawbreakers.
118. Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104 Cong. 164-
66 (1995) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liber-
ties Union).
119. By way of illustration, Nojeim offered a hypothetical of an objectionable
application of the proposed statute involving an individual being taught how to make
a "molotov cocktail" in order to make a "big statement" at an anti-government rally,
followed by abandonment of his plan. Id. at 167. Nojeim argued that, after abandon-
ment of the plan, the violent act at the rally was no longer "imminent" and the
student should not be held liable merely for receiving such training with the intent
to perform a specific illegal act. See id. However, the making of a molotov cocktail
(especially with a specific intent to use it in performing a violent act) is hardly a
protected act under the First Amendment, and the Brandenburg "imminence" require-
ment would not (and should not) apply. See id.
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Keeping the balance between freedom and order is one of
constitutional democracy's most delicate chores. As dangerous as
subversive speech and advocacy may seem to many, it is a para-
dox of democracy that the measure of our commitment to free-
dom is our willingness to risk that freedom, while having faith
that democracy's fundamental values will win out in the contest
of ideas that results from a robust First Amendment. We have
wisely measured the risks of controversial free speech against
the dangers posed by government censorship and concluded that
free speech should prevail over the temptation to silence those
who would undermine our institutions. However, when advocates
of subversion organize themselves to pose an immediate threat
to peace and order, the community as a whole is entitled to act
in defense of the very rights for which civil government was
created to preserve. And when groups of people act in concert to
flout the very laws that protect their own rights, society is per-
mitted to draw a line in favor of the rights of all against the
license of a few.
The same sort of balance is struck again and again, with
both the right to arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment
and the free speech values secured by the First Amendment.
While today many see the right to arms as anachronistic, the
framers perceived this right as fundamentally related to the
preservation of the other rights civil society is designed to se-
cure. Until the Constitution is amended, this right should be
respected as to every individual, regardless of party or political
creed. Again, however, there are limits to the claims that can be
made on behalf of any right. The Second Amendment was not
drafted to grant broad rights to armed factions inclined to oppose
the very structures created by our democratic freedoms. The
First Amendment's freedom of expression loses its force when
the line is crossed to violence or threat of violence. So too, the
Second Amendment's right to arms is limited by its purpose to
facilitate the personal right to self-defense and the community's
right to defend itself against outside aggression or tyranny; the
Second Amendment gives no protection to private armies waiting
for an opportunity to confront the larger community with force.
In short, we keep the balance true by first acknowledging the
force of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, even when
they give protection to those with whom we strongly disagree
and may consider dangerous, and second by carefully judging the
limits of individual rights when lines are crossed that threaten
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the community at large.
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